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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Brandon Piekarsky and Derrick Donchak were 
convicted in federal court for the brutal beating and eventual 
death of Luis Ramirez, a resident of the Defendants’ town.  
The Defendants were charged with criminal violation of the 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3631, which penalizes actions 
taken against an individual on account of his race, color or 
national origin, and with the specific intent to intimidate the 
victim or others like him from exercising their right to 
housing free of discrimination.  On appeal, they argue that the 
District Court erred in instructing the jury that the 
Government was not required to prove that issues of race and 
occupancy were the Defendants’ only motivations in beating 
Ramirez.  The Defendants also raise other issues, including 
whether double jeopardy barred their federal trial and whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under § 
3631.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I.   
A. 
 This case arises out of an exceedingly disturbing series 
of events that culminated in the beating and eventual death of 
Luis Ramirez, a resident of Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, on 
July 12, 2008.  Donchak and Piekarsky, then eighteen and 
sixteen years old, respectively, were also residents of 
Shenandoah.  On the night of July 12, 2008, they were 
accompanied by a group of other young Shenandoah 
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residents: Brian Scully, Ben Lawson, Colin Walsh and Josh 
Redmond, all of whom played high school football with, and 
were close friends of, the Defendants.  Scully, Walsh and 
Redmond were key witnesses for the federal prosecution in 
this case.   
 At trial, the testimony revealed that members of this 
group regularly made derogatory comments about Hispanic or 
Latino individuals, and frequently voiced their displeasure 
with the presence of such individuals in Shenandoah.  The 
friends often referred to such individuals as “Mexicans” 
because they considered it to be a derogatory term.  (Append. 
221.)  Scully testified that he, Donchak and Walsh would 
frequently discuss the increasing Hispanic population in 
Shenandoah, and would say things like “Get them out of 
here,” or “[I]t’s not good for our [t]own.”  (Id.)   Lawson 
testified that these sentiments were shared by many people in 
his high school class.  (Append. 211-12.)  Walsh testified that 
Donchak, in particular, was very vocal in these sentiments, 
and that he “really didn’t like Hispanic people.”  (Append. 
379.)   He also stated that Donchak often wore a t-shirt that 
said “Border Patrol,” and drove through town blasting “The 
White Man Marches On”—a white supremacist anthem that 
glorifies the use of violence against minorities—from the 
speakers of his pickup truck.  (Append. 379, 381.) 
 On the night of Ramirez’s beating, Piekarsky, 
Donchak, and their friends encountered Luis Ramirez and 
became engaged in a verbal disagreement with him.  That 
verbal disagreement escalated to a physical altercation which 
resulted in the savage beating of Ramirez by Donchak, 
Piekarsky and other members of the group as he lay on the 
ground.  Ramirez died two days later as a result of the injuries 
he sustained.   
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 Prior to that encounter, the group had been partying 
and drinking malt liquor near a creek in Shenandoah for two 
or more hours.  They then attended a neighborhood Polish 
American block party, but were asked to leave shortly after 
they arrived, when Piekarsky became involved in a verbal 
altercation with another partygoer and had to be physically 
restrained by his friends.  
 It was after they left the party, while walking through a 
neighborhood park, that the group encountered Ramirez, who 
was accompanied by Roxanne Rector.  Scully made a 
comment to Rector to the effect that it was too late for her to 
be out.  Ramirez, who was sitting nearby on a park swing, 
stood up and said something to the group in Spanish.  Scully 
responded to Ramirez, saying, “This is Shenandoah.  This is 
America. Go back to Mexico.”  (Append. 149.)  From there, 
the situation escalated.  Ramirez responded with more words, 
and took out his cell phone to call someone.  Donchak called 
Ramirez a “Spic,” (Append. 228) and Walsh told Ramirez to 
“Get the fuck out of here” (Append. 387, 639).  Ramirez, at 
Rector’s insistence, began walking backwards out of the park 
and away from the group. 
 When Ramirez reached the street, he turned his back to 
the group and continued to walk away.  Piekarsky, joined by 
Walsh and Scully, ran after Ramirez.  Piekarsky and Ramirez 
began fighting, and Piekarsky eventually picked Ramirez up 
and threw him to the ground.  Piekarsky apparently attempted 
to kick Ramirez while he was down, but tripped and fell over.  
By the time Ramirez stood up, Donchak had run over from 
the park and begun repeatedly punching Ramirez in the face, 
calling him a “fucking Spic.”  (Append. 389-90.)  Ramirez 
eventually fell to the ground, at which point the rest of the 
group joined in on the beating.   
 7 
 
 At this point, the group was positioned across the 
street from the park, in front of a home.  Donchak, Walsh, 
Piekarsky and Scully stood over Ramirez and kicked him 
repeatedly.  Walsh testified that he kicked Ramirez  in the 
lower body “just once,” but that “everybody else was kicking 
him in the upper part, in his head and his chest and his upper 
body.”  (Append. 391.) 
 The kicking stopped when Victor Garcia—Ramirez’s 
friend, whom he had called on his cell phone at the beginning 
of the altercation—arrived with his then-fiancée Arielle, 
whom the Defendants knew from school.  As Garcia 
approached, the group broke up and began walking down the 
street.  One member of the group called at Garcia, screaming, 
“Fucking Mexican.”  (Append. 545-546.)  Donchak, who was 
still standing nearby, threw a few more punches at Ramirez 
and, as he walked away, turned and again said, “Fuck you 
Spic.”  Walsh addressed Arielle and said, “This isn’t racial.”  
(Append. 392.)  Scully turned and said, “Go home, you 
Mexican motherfucker.”  (Append. 233-234.)  Apparently 
provoked by these comments, Ramirez—who was standing at 
this point—charged at Scully, and the two began fighting.   
Walsh ran up and punched Ramirez in the face, causing him 
to fall backwards “like a brick,” slamming his head against 
the concrete.  (Append. 527.)  Then, as Ramirez lay on the 
ground, motionless, Piekarsky ran up and kicked Ramirez in 
the side of the head.  Arielle testified that the kick delivered 
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was so forceful that it made a “crack” sound, and caused 
Ramirez’s head to fly to the side.1
 Witnesses testified that, immediately after Piekarsky 
kicked him in the head, Ramirez began convulsing and 
making “snoring” sounds.  (Append. 488.)  The Defendants 
and their friends fled the scene at this point.  One member of 
the group—either Piekarsky or Scully—yelled, “Tell your 
fucking Mexican friends to get the fuck out of Shenandoah or 
you’re going to be fucking laying next to him.”  (Append. 
325.)  Someone called 9-1-1, but Ramirez was unconscious 
and unresponsive when medical help arrived.  By that time, 
his head was misshapen, and his face was swollen.  He was 
taken by helicopter to a nearby trauma center.  Two days 
later, he died.  
  (Append. 488.)  
 In the days after the accident, the Defendants and their 
friends hatched a plan to conceal what had happened during 
the fight with Ramirez.  That plan appears to have included 
the Defendants, their friends, Piekarsky’s mother, and three 
officers of the Shenandoah Police Department—Officer Jason 
Hayes, Lt. William Moyer and Chief of Police Matthew 
Nestor,2
                                            
1 Medical testimony produced at trial stated that the kick, 
combined with the fall that preceded it, were the cause of the 
damage to Ramirez’s skull and his eventual death.  
 all of whom were friends of the Piekarsky family.  
2 In a separate federal proceeding, Nestor, Moyer and Hayes 
were tried together on charges of conspiracy and obstruction 
of justice, stemming from these events.  Following trial, a 
jury convicted Nestor of obstruction of justice in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1519.  Moyer was convicted of making false 
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Witnesses testified at trial that, in the hours immediately 
following the incident, both Donchak and Piekarsky spoke 
with Hayes and Moyer.  The group of men who had been 
present at the fight also met at Donchak’s home to discuss the 
fight.  Piekarsky, who was talking with Moyer and Hayes at 
this time, called the group and assured them that he had told 
the police that the fight was not racially motivated, had only 
been a fight between Walsh and Ramirez, and that Walsh had 
acted in self defense.  He also withheld the fact that he had 
kicked Ramirez in the head.  
 Piekarsky and his mother arrived at Donchak’s house 
later than the others and told the group that they needed to 
“get a story.”  By this time, they had learned that Ramirez 
would likely die from his injuries.  At the same meeting, 
according to the testimony of Redmond and Scully, the 
Defendants joked about getting the name “Lupe” tattooed on 
their bodies, given that Ramirez was “Mexican.”  (Append. 
242, 302, 650.)   The evidence also showed that, during this 
time, Piekarsky’s mother was in constant contact with Hayes 
and Moyer, as well as Chief Nestor. 
 The day after the assault, Scully was interviewed by 
Moyer, Hayes and two detectives from the Schuylkill County 
District Attorney’s Office.  Scully testified at trial that, at this 
                                                                                                  
statements in a police report, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  
Hayes was acquitted of all charges.  See United States v. 
Nestor, No. 3:09-CR-397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55890 
(M.D. Pa., May 25, 2011).  We recently affirmed those 
convictions on appeal.  United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192 
(3d Cir. 2012).  
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interview, he intentionally withheld information regarding the 
drinking the group had done the night before, the kick to 
Ramirez’s head and the use of racial epithets.  Shortly after, 
the group met again—this time explicitly in order to get their 
stories straight.  The boys’ parents discussed the situation in 
the living room, while the boys spoke in the back yard.  The 
group agreed to tell the police that no one had kicked Ramirez 
and that no one had been drinking.  They also agreed to tell 
the police that the fight was not racially motivated and to hide 
the fact that they had yelled racial slurs during the beating.3
 It was only after the District Attorney’s Office fully 
took over investigation of the case—roughly one week after 
the incident—that the group’s stories began to unravel.  
During follow-up interviews with the District Attorney’s 
Office, Redmond, Scully and Walsh recanted their previous 
statements and told investigators what had really happened on 
the night Ramirez was beaten.  
  
B. 
In July 2008, the Defendants were indicted in Shuylkill 
County Court with aggravated assault, simple assault, 
reckless endangerment of another person and ethnic 
intimidation—a general hate-crime under Pennsylvania law.4
                                            
3 For a complete account of the details of the cover-up by the 
police, see Moyer, 674 F.3d 192.  
  
4 Under Pennsylvania’s ethnic intimidation statute, an 
individual violates the statute where he acts (1) with  
malicious intention toward the actual or perceived race, color, 
religion, etc. of an individual or group of individuals; and (2) 
commits a offense relating to arson, criminal mischief or 
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Donchak was also charged with hindering apprehension or 
prosecution, corruption of minors with alcohol, underage 
drinking, and furnishing alcohol to minors.  Piekarsky, 
because he was alleged to have been the person who kicked 
Ramirez in the head, was also charged with third-degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter.  State authorities also 
charged him with criminal solicitation to hinder apprehension 
or prosecution/giving false reports to law enforcement 
authorities, and with underage drinking.5
In August 2008, federal authorities became more 
involved in the investigation of Ramirez’s death.  At several 
points in their respective investigations, state and federal 
authorities shared information and resources in investigating 
these crimes, and in conducting interviews of key witnesses. 
 
The state trial commenced in April 2009.  After five 
days of trial and eight hours of deliberation, a Schuylkill 
County jury acquitted Piekarsky of all but the simple assault 
charge against him.  Donchak was convicted of simple 
assault, corruption of minors and furnishing of alcohol to 
                                                                                                  
other property crimes as defined by Pennsylvania law; or (3) 
commits and crime against the targeted individual’s person.  
18 Pa. C.S. § 2710. 
5 County prosecutors also charged Colin Walsh with murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, simple assault, 
reckless endangerment of another person, and ethnic 
intimidation.  Walsh signed a proffer agreement and 
cooperated with the state and federal officials.  The charges 
against Walsh were, ultimately, dismissed.  Walsh thereafter 
served as a key witness against the Defendants. 
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minors.  Both Donchak and Piekarsky were sentenced with 6-
23 months’ imprisonment.  Both were released on probation 
approximately six months later.  
The state court verdict triggered public outcry from 
members of the town, special interest groups and public 
figures. Shortly after the verdict, then-Governor Rendell 
wrote the Department of Justice, acknowledging the 
Department’s ongoing investigation into the assault on 
Ramirez and requesting that it consider bringing civil rights 
charges against Piekarsky and Donchak.   Following the 
conclusion of its investigation into the matter, the Department 
of Justice filed federal charges. 
 In December 2010, a federal grand jury indicted 
Piekarsky and Donchak on charges of interfering with 
Ramirez’s federal housing rights under 42 U.S.C. § 3631. 
That statute criminalizes conduct that interferes with, 
intimidates or injures an individual because of his race or 
national origin, and because he is or is considering occupying 
a dwelling in a given neighborhood.  Id.  Donchak was also 
charged with conspiring to falsify, and aiding and abetting in 
the falsification of, official police reports in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and with obstruction of justice pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 2.  Both Defendants pled not guilty to the 
charges and filed a joint motion to have the indictment under 
§ 3631 dismissed for failure to state a claim, and under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, in light of their acquittal in state court.  The 
District Court denied these motions. 
 In February 2011, following trial, a federal jury in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania found the Defendants guilty 
of criminal violations of the Fair Housing Act. Donchak was 
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also convicted of conspiring with local police, and with 
aiding and abetting in the falsification of official police 
reports in frustration of a federal investigation.6
C. 
  The District 
Court sentenced Piekarsky to 108 months’ imprisonment, to 
be followed by three years of supervised release.  Donchak 
received a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment for the 
housing crime, 108 months’ imprisonment on the aiding and 
abetting crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and 30 months’ 
imprisonment for the aiding and abetting violation under 18 
U.S.C. § 371, all terms to run concurrently and to be followed 
by three years’ supervised release.  This appeal followed. 
 The Defendants now challenge, jointly and 
individually, numerous aspects of their convictions, their 
sentences, and certain decisions made by the District Court at 
trial. Together, they contend that the federal trial, which 
followed their acquittals in state court, violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that the District 
Court erred in instructing the jury on the appropriate legal 
standards under 42 U.S.C. § 3631.  They also argue that the 
District Court misapplied United States Sentencing Guideline 
§ 2H1.1 when it calculated their  Offense Levels using 
Voluntary Manslaughter—rather than Involuntary 
                                            
6 At the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, Donchak 
moved to dismiss one count of obstruction of justice for 
insufficient evidence.  The District Court granted that motion.  
Count 3 of the indictment, which also charged obstruction of 
justice under § 1519, was not dismissed. 
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Manslaughter—as the underlying offense for purposes of 
their conviction under § 3631. 
 Individually, Piekarsky also contends that the District 
Court erred in precluding him from arguing, before the jury, 
the differences between race, ethnicity, alienage and 
immigration status, and that § 3631 did not apply under the 
facts of this case; that the District Court unduly limited his 
ability to cross-examine a witness about her feelings about the 
state-court acquittal; and that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict him under § 3631.  Donchak challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions under 
§§ 1519 and  371.  He also argues that there was a variance 
between his indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy to 
falsify reports in hindrance of a federal investigation under 
§ 371 and the government’s proof at trial, which he argues 
proved, at best, two conspiracies. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  Our review is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
II. 
  Donchak and Piekarsky appeal the District Court’s 
instruction to the jury on Count One of the Indictment, which 
charged a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. § 3631.  Under § 3631, it is a crime to intimidate or 
interfere with any person “because of his race . . . and because 
he is or has been . . . occupying . . . any dwelling.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 3631(a).  Similarly, it is a crime to “intimidate such person 
or any other person or any class of persons from” occupying a 
dwelling.  Id. § 3631(b).   
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 At trial, Donchak and Piekarsky requested that the 
District Court provide an additional instruction to the jury on 
the meaning of § 3631 and proposed the following language:  
[I]n order to find the Defendants . . . guilty of 
Count One[,] the jury must be satisfied that the 
Government has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendants were motivated to 
commit an unlawful assault against Luis 
Ramirez because of his race AND because he 
was occupying a dwelling in Shenandoah.  The 
Government must prove that the assault of Luis 
Ramirez occurred because of both of those 
reasons.  The word “because” in the statute is 
to be understood in its common meaning.  
Dictionaries define the word “because” to 
mean “for the reason that,” or “by reason of,” 
or “due to.”  
(Supp. Append. 121 (emphasis and capitalization in 
original).)  In effect, Donchak and Piekarsky urged the 
District Court to instruct the jury that race and residency had 
to be the sole or primary motivation behind the assault. 
 The District Court refused to instruct the jury in this 
manner, holding that, under statutes in which racial animus is 
a basis for or an element of the crime, race need only be a 
motivating factor, and not the predominant purpose.  Instead, 
the District Court instructed the jury as to the elements of a 
crime under § 3631, which included a showing that the 
“defendants acted on [account] of racial bias and the 
occupancy of a dwelling in Shenandoah.”  (Append. 994.)  It 
then went on to explain to the jury that, in order to satisfy the 
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third element of the crime, the government was required to 
prove that the defendants 
acted because of Mr. Ramirez’s race and 
because of the race of other Latino persons 
occupying dwellings in Shenandoah and 
because Luis Ramirez and other Latino persons 
were occupying dwellings in Shenandoah. * * * 
The government need not prove that these were 
[the Defendants’] only motivation[s]. 
 In other words, the government need not 
prove that race and occupancy were the only 
reasons for their actions.  The presence of other 
motives, such as personal dislike, anger or 
revenge does not make the conduct any less a 
violation of the statute, Section 3631. 
(Append. 994-95 (emphasis added).)    
 On appeal, Donchak and Piekarsky maintain that this 
instruction, referred to as a “mixed motive” instruction, 
misstated the legal standard governing the specific intent 
requirement under § 3631.  They argue that the instruction 
was in error because it “ignored the plain text of § 3631” by 
“diluting” the “plain, universally understood meaning” of the 
word “because” and inviting the jury to convict the 
Defendants “even if they found that Piekarsky and Donchak 
had other motives.”  (Piekarsky Br. at 49; Donchak Br. at 37.)  
Instead, they submit that “mixed motive” instructions under § 
3631 are improper, and ask this Court to vacate the conviction 
under § 3631 and remand for a new trial.    
 Where, as here, a criminal defendant argues that the 
district court’s jury instructions misstated the applicable law, 
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our review is plenary.  United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 
231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. McLaughlin, 386 
F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 2004).  Where the language of a 
district court’s given instruction is legally sound and the court 
has additional proposed language by a party before it, 
“[r]efusal to give a proposed instruction is reversible error 
only if the omitted instruction is correct, is not substantially 
covered by other instructions, and is so important that its 
omission prejudiced the defendant.”  United States v. Urban, 
404 F.3d 754, 779 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations 
omitted).   
 Thus, we are presented with two questions: first, 
whether the District Court’s “mixed motive” instruction to the 
jury “misstated the applicable law” under § 3631;   second, 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
include the Defendants’ proposed language purporting to 
define or underscore the meaning of the word “because” 
under § 3631.   
A.  
 Under § 3631, a party may be convicted where he, “by 
force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or 
interferes” with– 
(a) any person because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap * * *, familial status 
* * *, or national origin and because he is or 
has been selling, purchasing, renting, 
financing, occupying, or contracting or 
negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, 
financing or occupation of any dwelling, or 
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applying for or participating in any service, 
organization, or facility relating to the 
business of selling or renting dwellings; or 
(b) any person because he is or has been, or in 
order to intimidate such person or any other 
person or any class of persons from– 
(1) participating, without discrimination on 
account of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap * * *, familial status * * *, or 
national origin, in any of the activities, 
services, organizations or facilities described 
in [§ 3631(a)]; or 
(2) affording another person or class of 
persons opportunity or protection so to 
participate[.] 
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a), (b) (emphasis added).  The statute, 
passed in 1968 as part of a suite of legislation designed to 
address racial discrimination at the height of the Civil Rights 
Movement, was intended to target the various means by 
which certain classes of individuals were discriminated 
against in renting, purchasing or owning property in certain 
neighborhoods.  S. Rep. No. 90-721 (1967), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1842-43.  It was also meant to provide a 
gap-filling measure for enforcing individual rights to housing, 
free of discrimination or intimidation, where Congress 
believed state law had fallen short or had abdicated 
responsibility altogether.  Id.  Under § 3631, when an 
individual commits such an act of intimidation by inflicting 
physical injury on another person, he or she is subject to 
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criminal prosecution and a sentence of up to ten years.  Id. at 
1841. 
 We begin by noting that the District Court’s 
instructions to the jury on the elements of proof required 
under § 3631 restate—almost verbatim—the language of the 
statute itself.  To the extent the instructions employ the 
language of § 3631, they do not, of course, misstate the law.  
The relevant question, then, is whether the District Court’s 
statement that “the presence of other motives, such as 
personal dislike, anger or revenge does not make the conduct 
any less a violation of the statute” in some way misstates 
what § 3631 requires. 
 This Circuit has not previously examined or 
determined the extent to which a showing of mixed motives is 
legally sufficient to support a conviction under § 3631.  The 
opinions of our sister circuits, however, provide ample 
support for the proposition that a conviction based on “mixed 
motives” falls well within the reach of § 3631, so long as the 
evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant’s actions 
were taken because of the defendant’s animus toward a 
protected class and on account of an intent to intimidate a 
member of that protected class of individuals from exercising 
his housing rights under the Act.  Since the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 
1980), courts have been in general agreement that, under § 
3631, the “presence of other motives . . . does not make [a 
defendant’s] conduct any less a violation of § 3631,” id. at 
676. 
 Most recently, in United States v. Craft, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the conviction under § 3631 of a defendant 
who had committed arson at several structures in South Bend, 
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Indiana—only two of which were homes owned by 
individuals who fell within a protected class under § 3631.  
The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his convictions under § 3631, arguing in part that 
he had ulterior motives for burning the houses.  One of the 
resident-victims, a black man, owed him money, and the 
defendant argued that that was the reason he had burned the 
victim’s house.  The Seventh Circuit found this argument 
unavailing, stating that the government was not required to 
prove that racial animus was the defendant’s “sole 
motivation.”  “Rather, it was only required to prove that the 
victims’ race or ethnicity partially motivated” the crimes.  
484 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. 
Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 2001)).   Craft was 
consistent with language from the Seventh Circuit’s earlier 
opinion in United States v. Hartbarger,  in which that court 
noted, in a footnote, that the district court had correctly 
instructed the jurors in a § 3631 case that “defendants could 
be found guilty even if they had mixed motives in committing 
the act.”  148 F.3d 777, 784 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998), overruled on 
other grounds by United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 576 
(7th Cir. 2003).  Though the defendants’ appeal in 
Hartbanger was not itself a challenge to the district court’s 
“mixed motives” instruction, that court’s language is 
nonetheless telling, given that the Hartbarger defendants had 
argued earlier in the proceedings that they had burned a cross 
in the victim’s yard for personal reasons—a previous verbal 
altercation with him—and not because of his race.  148 F.3d 
at 779, 784 n.6; see also Magleby, 241 F.3d at 1310 
(approving instruction in a § 3631 case, challenged on other 
grounds, in which the district court stated that “[i]t does not 
matter that the defendant may have had more than one motive 
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in performing the act as long as . . . race was one of his 
motives”).     
 Because these cases involve challenges to the 
sufficiency of evidence under a conviction under § 3631 they 
are demonstrative of what passes legal muster under that 
provision.  Donchak and Piekarsky concede that the reasoning 
of these cases would foreclose their line of argument, but urge 
us to disregard them because those holdings, they argue, 
“ignore the plain text of § 3631.”  (Piekarsky Br. at 49; 
Donchak Br. at 31.)  We disagree.  
 Indeed, in analyzing similar text in an analogous 
context, our own case law makes clear that a “mixed motive” 
jury instruction sets forth the correct legal standard for crimes 
involving a specific intent to deprive a victim of a protected 
right.  See United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1979).  
In Ellis, we reviewed jury instructions given regarding 
criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibits 
conspiracies undertaken to deprive an individual of his civil 
rights, or “because of his having so exercised the same.”  The 
district court in that case refused a proposed defense 
instruction that stated that the intent to deprive the victim of 
his civil rights needed to be the “predominant purpose” of the 
conspiracy.  On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s 
decision, noting that the proposed instruction would 
inappropriately invite jurors to override the guiding purpose 
of the legislation—the prevention of constitutional injuries—
by also finding that the parties had some other permissible 
purpose.  Ellis, 595 F.2d at 162; see also United States v. 
Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1997) (approving 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not 
matter “that a defendant may also have been motivated by 
hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion”); cf. United 
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States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. § 245 
that stated that “the presence of other motives . . . does not 
make his conduct any less a violation” of the statute); Craft, 
484 F.3d at 926 (stating that, under § 3631, the government 
need only prove that “race or ethnicity partially motivated” 
the crimes). 
The Defendants argue that Ellis is inapposite, since the 
defendants in Ellis “did not have ‘mixed motives,’” and 
because the legislation in Ellis is not identically worded to 
§ 3631.  (Piekarsky Br. at 46; Donchak Br. at 28.)  We find 
these arguments unpersuasive.  First, the Defendants ignore 
the fact that the statute we analyzed in Ellis does, in part, rely 
on the word “because” in stating the proscribed specific 
intent.  An individual violates § 241 when he conspires to 
“injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate” any person in the 
exercise of his constitutional rights and privileges, “or 
because of his having so exercised the same.”   Second, while 
Ellis does not refer to the defendants’ having “mixed 
motives,” specifically, it does concern the defendants’ 
“purpose” in conspiring as they had to violate the victim’s 
constitutional rights.  595 F.2d at 162.  The parallel to this 
case is readily apparent:  A purpose, like a motive, is “the 
reason for which something is done.”  OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2012); cf.  Supp. Append. 121 (Defendants’ 
Proposed Jury Instruction) (proposing the District Court 
define “because” for purposes of § 3631, to mean “by reason 
of,” “for the reason that,” and “due to”).   
Thus, though the language of the statutes may differ, 
we consider our interpretation under § 241 to be instructive in 
this case.  To that end, the import of Ellis is the degree to 
which it underscores this Circuit’s concern that the general 
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purpose of such statutes—those designed to deter and punish 
acts taken with the specific intent of depriving a victim of a 
federally recognized right—not be undermined by the ease 
with which a defendant can argue that he had some additional 
motive or purpose in acting as he did.  This is a reading that is 
reinforced by the plain text of § 3631 and the legislative 
purpose in its enactment.   
The Defendants’ argument that the District Court 
impermissibly diluted the legal standard under § 3631 
necessarily relies on the implicit proposition that the statute 
uses the word “because,” under its “ordinary meaning” 
(Piekarsky Br. at 49; Donchak Br. at 31-32), to mean 
“primarily,” or even “singularly.”  To be sure, the Defendants 
are correct that a word in a statute, unless otherwise defined, 
is understood by its ordinary meaning.  However, we decline 
to accept the Defendants’ argument that the ordinary meaning 
of the word “because” carries the weight that they would 
assign to it.   
The word “because” is defined to mean “for the reason 
that,” “on account of,” and “by reason of.”  OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2012).  Those meanings do not, necessarily, 
connote exclusivity or predominance.  Nor, viewing the word 
in the context of the statute as a whole, are we compelled to 
adopt such a reading.  As § 3631 itself makes clear, 
something can be done “because of” multiple reasons.  See § 
3631 (premising violation on actions taken “because of” race 
and “because of” occupancy).  Certainly, then, “because” 
cannot connote exclusivity. 
Indeed, the inclusion of such language would threaten 
to limit drastically the availability of the protections afforded 
by § 3631—a result not intended by Congress in the drafting 
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of this statute.  Rather, in passing the legislation at hand, 
Congress intended to “broadly prohibit” the use of violence as 
a means of intimidating individuals from exercising their 
federal rights, and to create a powerful, useful federal tool for 
filling in state-law shortcomings in this area.  See S. Rep. No. 
90-721, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1837-45. It did so by targeting 
and criminalizing actions taken with a very specific 
proscribed intent:  the intent to injure, intimidate or interfere 
with a person’s exercise of his or her rights, under the Fair 
Housing Act, because of that person’s race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status or national origin.  Where a 
jury, presented with all the evidence, determines that that 
specific intent is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the case before it, the dictates of § 3631 have been met and a 
conviction is appropriate.  See Johns, 615 F.2d at 675 (“The 
presence of other motives,” so long as the proscribed intent is 
found, “does not make [the] conduct any less a violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 3631.”).   
The Defendants argue that this reading of § 3631 is too 
broad—that, under this construction, “a single racial  
epithet . . . uttered in the anger and intemperate speech of an 
entirely random street fight, caused by an insult or by merely 
personal animus, could become the basis for a conviction 
under the Fair Housing Act.”  (Piekarsky Br. at 50; Donchak 
Br. at 32-33.)  Of course, as the facts above demonstrated, 
this is not a case involving “a single racial epithet.”  
Bearing in mind that the issue before us concerns the 
legality of mixed motive instructions given to the jury, which 
considers their application in light of the evidence and the 
arguments offered by both the prosecution and the defense, 
we are confident that—even under a “mixed motives” jury 
instruction—a single untoward comment would not yield 
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such a heavy handed result.  Nor is it likely that a single racial 
epithet, taken alone, would be sufficient to demonstrate that 
the Defendants’ conduct was motivated by an intent to 
discriminate on the basis of the victim’s attempt to peacefully 
reside in a given neighborhood.   
As we have said, Congress has criminalized certain 
conduct, taken with specifically proscribed intent, through its 
enactment of § 3631.  As other Circuits’ cases dealing with § 
3631 make clear, at trial, a defendant has the opportunity to 
present his defense and to demonstrate to the jury that, 
whatever the facts, he did not hold this specific intent at the 
time of the alleged crime.  It is the jury that is tasked with 
evaluating the facts and determining whether § 3631 applies, 
or whether a defendant’s use of racial epithets or his 
personally held biases are instead merely incidental to his 
other motivations for acting as he did.  Our holding here—
which merely limits the word “because” to what we take to be 
its plain, ordinary, congressionally intended meaning—has 
not so “diluted” the language of that statute so as to render 
that evaluation meaningless. 
B. 
 We next consider whether, despite the legal soundness 
of its own instructions, the District Court abused its discretion 
in declining to include the language regarding the meaning of 
the word “because,” proposed by the Defendants.  As 
previously stated, a district court abuses its discretion in 
refusing to give a proposed instruction only insofar as the 
proposed language (1) is correct; (2) is not substantially 
covered by other instructions; and (3) is so important that its 
omission prejudices the defendant.  Urban, 404 F.3d at 779 
(citations omitted).  Applying this standard, we conclude that 
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the District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the 
Defendants’ proposed additional language.  
 Aside from requesting that the Court remove the 
mixed motives language from the jury instructions—language 
which we have found to be a correct statement of the law 
under § 3631—the Defendants’ also requested that the Court 
explain the definition of the word “because” for the jury.  As 
the Defendants repeatedly point out, “because” is a word with 
an ordinary meaning.  As a result, the addition of a clarifying 
definition—as proposed by the Defendants—was not 
necessary to the jury’s understanding of the instructions it 
received.  To the extent that inclusion of the word “because” 
was intended to instruct the jury that “because” means “only” 
or “predominantly,” that reading is in conflict with the law, 
and the District Court was correct to reject that language.  
III. 
 In addition to the Defendants’ challenges to the jury 
instructions, Piekarsky also challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his conviction under § 3631.7
                                            
7 Donchak does not raise this challenge on appeal.   
  “The 
burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.”  United States 
v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Where, as here, a defendant has preserved the issue 
for appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Government.  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We afford great deference to, and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of, the jury’s verdict.  Id. 
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 Piekarsky argues that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to establish a violation of § 3631 because (1) 
Ramirez was an undocumented alien, had “no right to be in 
the United States” and thus “[did] not have a federally 
protected right to housing in the United States;” and (2) 
Piekarsky did not know that Ramirez “occupied or intended 
to occupy a dwelling in Shenandoah.”8
 On the law alone, we find these arguments wanting.  
The text of § 3631(a) and (b)—the provisions under which 
the Defendants were charged—contains no requirement that 
the victimized individual be a citizen of the United States or 
otherwise lawfully residing here.  Instead, both (a) and (b) 
criminalize conduct against “any person because of his race, 
color, . . . or national origin.  Id.  This language rests in stark 
contrast to the text of § 3631(c), which does contain an 
explicit limitation on the scope of its protection, reaching 
only “any citizen” who exercises, or aids others in the 
exercise of, their federally guaranteed housing rights.  We 
find this omission fatal to Piekarsky’s argument.  See Prestol 
Espinal v. Att’y General, 653 F.3d 213, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“[W]here Congress ‘includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
   (Piekarsky Br. at 29-
30.)   
                                            
8 The defendants also raised this issue in a joint pretrial 
motion to dismiss this count of the indictment, arguing that it 
“fail[ed] to allege that they knew [Ramirez] occupied a 
dwelling in Shenandoah.”  (Append. 18 (District Court 
Pretrial Memorandum, Aug. 11, 2010).) 
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and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” 
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 As to whether the evidence was sufficient to 
demonstrate that Piekarsky knew that Ramirez “occupied or 
intended to occupy” a residence in Shenandoah, this argument 
is similarly unavailing.  As the language of the statute makes 
clear, the victimized individual need not be a resident or 
future resident of a given neighborhood in order for the 
protections of § 3631 to apply.  Rather, under § 3631(b), it is 
enough that an individual is victimized “in order to intimidate 
. . . any other person or any class of persons” from exercising 
their federally guaranteed housing rights.   
 Thus, under § 3631(b), all the Government needed to 
prove at trial was that Ramirez was injured because the 
Defendants intended to send a message to others that they 
were not welcome to live in Shenandoah on account of their 
“race, color . . . or national origin.”9
                                            
9 Piekarsky argues in his reply that, whatever the law under § 
3631, the District Court itself stated that the government was 
required to show that Piekarsky knew or believed that 
Ramirez was a resident of Shenandoah, because the District 
Court said, during jury instructions, that § 3631 “requires 
proof that Mr. Piekarsky and/or Mr. Donchak intended to 
intimidate or interfere with Luis Ramirez because he was 
occupying a dwelling in Shenandoah.”  (Append. 992-95.)  
However, reading the instructions in their entirety, it is 
sufficiently clear that the District Court provided an accurate 
statement of the law as we have described it.  Shortly after 
making the statement relied on by Piekarsky on appeal, the 
District Court clarified that the “government must simply 
  Cf. United States v. 
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Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating broad 
congressional intent to prevent housing discrimination and 
intimidation, generally).   Under this reading of § 3631, and 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government, we have no trouble concluding that the evidence 
before the jury was sufficient to support the guilty verdict 
under § 3631.   
 To be sure, this case lacks the explicit and overt 
reliance on the racially charged symbols—such as cross-
burning—that are so immediately evocative of an intent to 
intimidate an individual on account of his race, his color or 
his national origin.  See, e.g., Magleby, 241 F.3d at 1313 
(describing burning crosses as “symbols of racial hatred”).  
Similarly, the nexus to housing issues or housing rights is less 
explicit here than it is in cases involving crosses burning in 
front yards or targeted acts of arson.  See, e.g., Craft, 484 
F.3d at 926.  However, such explicit evidence is not required 
to support a finding of specific intent.  
 In cases involving a necessary finding of specific 
intent, a jury may draw inferences of subjective intent from 
evidence of the defendant’s objective acts, and from 
circumstantial evidence.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 333.  Though a 
                                                                                                  
show that Mr. Piekarsky . . . intended to do something that 
would have the effect of interfering with Mr. Ramirez’s right 
to occupy a dwelling in Shenandoah.”  It later described the 
relevant intent as an intent to interfere with the rights of Mr. 
Ramirez and “other Latino persons” to “live in Shenandoah 
free of racial intimidation.”  (Id.) 
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defendant may deny having the requisite intent, and may offer 
evidence suggestive of that argument, the jury may weigh all 
the evidence before it and choose to disbelieve him if “his 
words and acts in light of all the circumstances make his 
explanation seem improbable.”  Magleby, 241 F.3d at 1312 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 At trial, the government presented evidence that, on 
the night of July 12, 2008, the Defendants and their friends 
hurled an array of racially charged comments at Ramirez, 
repeatedly calling him a “spic” and, alternately, a “fucking 
spic,” and a “fucking Mexican.”  Prior to the physical beating 
of Ramirez and immediately after, Scully—a member of the 
group was heard to say, “This is Shenandoah.  This is 
America.  Go back to Mexico.”  (Append. 150, 228.)  During 
the fight, Scully also turned and said, “Go home you Mexican 
motherfucker.”  (Append. 386-87.)  The same individual told 
Ramirez that Shenandoah was “our town” and that Ramirez 
didn’t “belong” there.  (Append. 387.)  Finally—and in light 
of the extensive amount of violence and racial epithets which 
preceded it—after the beating had ended, and Ramirez lay 
unconscious and convulsing on the ground, Piekarsky yelled, 
“Tell your fucking Mexican friends to get the fuck out of 
Shenandoah, or you’re going to be fucking laying next to 
him.”10
                                            
10 Walsh testified at trial that it was Scully who made this 
comment.  (Append. 645.)  Eileen Burke, a neighbor who 
witnesses the fight, testified that it was Piekarsky.  (Append. 
325.) 
  (Append. 325.) 
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 Viewing this evidence—coupled with the other 
testimony about the Defendants’ general dislike of Hispanic 
or Latino individuals moving into Shenandoah, supra—in the 
light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a 
reasonable juror could rationally conclude that the nature of 
the beating of Luis Ramirez, the extent of the violence 
involved in this case, and the gratuitous nature of the racial 
epithets flung about during the beating—both at Ramirez, and 
at his friend, Victor Garcia—were, taken together, indicative 
that Donchak and Piekarsky intended to injure Ramirez with 
the purpose of intimidating him, or other Hispanic or Latino 
individuals, from residing in Shenandoah.  
 Piekarsky was afforded the opportunity, at trial, to 
present his defense and to show the jurors that this was 
merely a case—in the words of Piekarsky’s attorney—of “a 
single racial epithet . . . uttered in the anger and intemperate 
speech of an entirely random street fight.”  (Piekarsky Br. at 
50.)  In light of the other evidence before them, the jurors 
were not convinced.  Instead, the jury found that the specific 
intent elements of § 3631 were met and it issued a guilty 
verdict.  We see no basis to upset that finding. 
IV. 
 Regarding their Double Jeopardy claim, the 
Defendants argue that, because they “were previously 
charged, tried, and acquitted of all but the Simple Assault 
[charge] in Schuylkill County court on the same incident,” the 
federal charges against them were barred by the Double 
Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.  (Piekarsky 
Br. at 18; Donchak Br. at 22.)  Because the doctrine of Dual 
Sovereignty applies to this case and forecloses the 
Defendants’ argument on appeal, we affirm the District 
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Court’s determination that Double Jeopardy did not bar the 
federal prosecution of this case.  
 The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall 
“be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Importantly, 
however, there are limits to the reach of the protection 
afforded by this language.   As is relevant to this case, under 
the doctrine of Dual Sovereignty, a state prosecution does not 
bar a subsequent federal prosecution for the same conduct. 
United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 352 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959); 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959); United States v. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).  The doctrine, articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. 
United States, is a recognition of the fact that the states and 
the federal government are separate sovereigns, with distinct 
interests in criminalizing and prosecuting certain conduct.   
 The Defendants concede that, on its face, the doctrine 
of Dual Sovereignty applies to bar this line of argument.  
Seeking to avoid this result, they urge this Court to adopt as 
law and apply what some have called the “Bartkus exception” 
to the Dual Sovereignty rule.  That exception, to the extent it 
has been recognized by federal courts, stems from language 
in which the Supreme Court  “alluded to the possibility that 
dual federal and state prosecutions might run afoul of the 
general rule affirming such prosecutions if one authority was 
acting as a surrogate for the other, or if the state prosecution 
was merely ‘a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution.’”  
United States v. Berry, 164 F.3d 844, 846 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24). 
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 As we stated in 1999, in Berry, “[a]lthough we have 
previously recognized the potential existence of an exception 
to the dual sovereignty rule under Bartkus, we have never 
applied the exception to overturn a second state or federal 
prosecution.”  Id. at 847 (citation omitted).  Nor do we see 
reason to do so here.  Though the federal and state authorities 
appear to have been cooperative with each other in 
conducting their investigations, and in sharing resources for 
the interviewing of witnesses, the Defendants have failed to 
point this Court’s attention to any evidence, beyond mere 
supposition, that the state authorities were puppets or 
surrogates for the federal authorities in this case.  Nor have 
the Defendants presented this Court with anything to support 
their claim that the state trial was a mere “sham,” conducted 
in anticipation of the federal proceedings.  In this case, the 
state and federal government each decided to prosecute the 
Defendants based on facts implicating its own valid interests 
as sovereign—Pennsylvania’s in criminalizing ethnic 
intimidation under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2710; the United States in 
prosecuting criminal housing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3631.  Viewing the unfolding of these proceedings in their 
entirety, the state trial “simply cannot be considered ‘a sham 
and a cover’ for a federal prosecution.”  See Berry, 164 F.3d 
at 847; see also United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 
1106-07 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the fact that “there 
was a considerable amount of federal-state cooperation” did 
not, alone, create a double jeopardy problem).  We thus 
affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Double Jeopardy 
did not bar the subsequent federal prosecution of this case. 
V. 
 Having carefully considered the Defendants’ various 
remaining arguments, we find them to be without merit.  We 
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therefore affirm the final conviction, judgment, and sentence 
of the District Court, in all respects.   
 
 
